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Mali: Another European Intervention 
without the EU? 
Rik Coolsaet, Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont 
As  French  forces  are  engaged  in  combat 
operations  in  Mali,  even  belated  EU 
involvement remains crucial, to ensure that 
the  intervention  fits  in  with  the  political 
end-state that the EU rightly pursues. 
Since  11  January,  French  land  and  air  forces, 
with  military  logistic  support  from  other  EU 
Member  States  (including  Belgium,  Denmark 
and  the  UK)  have  been  engaged  in  another 
combat  operation  in  Europe’s  “broader 
neighbourhood”,  in  Mali.  Other  EU  capitals, 
notably  Berlin,  have  expressed  clear  political 
support. The coalition is for the moment less 
grand than that which engaged in Libya, where 
several  Member  States  took  part  in  the  air 
campaign, though the challenges are at least as 
great,  and  the  chances  of  eventual  success, 
understood as lasting peace, as doubtful.  
 
Yet the French intervention was inevitable. 
Numerous factors are at play: the rapid advance 
of a coalition of local jihadist militias, together 
with an Algerian jihadist group, threatening the 
fall of the State; Mali’s neighbours’ fear of spill-
over of the eventual implosion of the Malian 
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State;  French  uranium  interests  in 
neighbouring Niger; and, what should be the 
most important of all, the very real fear of the 
people of Mali for the advancing militias. The 
French emergency operation was necessary in 
order not to jeopardize the deployment  of the 
envisaged  multinational  African  force,  acting 
under  UNSC  Resolution  2085,  which  is  to 
bring  peace  and  stability  to  this  poverty-
stricken  and  conflict-prone  region.  Will  it 
work?  
 
COMPREHENSIVE  CONDITIONS  FOR 
SUCCESS  
One cannot say that the French intervention is 
not in line with the broad European consensus 
on  conditions  for  the  use  of  force.  A  UN 
Resolution and a unanimous Security Council 
provide the necessary legal framework. There 
is  a  collective  European  political  framework 
too, in the shape of the comprehensive Sahel 
Strategy  adopted  by  the  EU,  including  an 
ambitious  security  dimension.  The  main 
responsibility for stabilizing Mali lies with an 
African force, which fits in with the EU policy 
of promoting African ownership.  
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But that in itself does not guarantee success. 
Decision-makers would do well to heed some 
of the key lessons from past operations.  
 
(1) Every operation needs a clearly defined 
political  objective,  which  can  realistically  be 
achieved through the envisaged military action. 
The military objectives on the ground that lead 
towards  this  political  end-state  must  be  as 
detailed  and  concrete  as  possible.  Vague 
objectives  and  lofty  goals  (“restoring 
democracy”) lead to mission creep – elements 
of which might already be in place – and the 
risk of unknowingly getting bogged down in a 
protracted  Malian  guerrilla  –  as  did  happen 
before in Afghanistan (and Vietnam).  
 
(2)  Foreign  interventions  cannot  succeed 
unless  their  objectives  fit  in  with  local 
dynamics. Nobody but local actors can in the 
end  tip  the  balance  –  foreign  military,  even 
from the region, cannot. In other words, Mali 
stands or falls with a credible government in 
Bamako  –  which  today  does  not  exist.  The 
current regime came into power after a military 
coup  in  March  2012,  which  brought  down  a 
democratically  elected  government,  however 
inept. It was precisely that coup that created the 
political  chaos  of  which  today’s  conflict  is  a 
direct consequence. Jihadist militias made use 
of the political vacuum in the capital and of the 
collapse of the Malian armed forces first to gain 
control of the north of the country and then to 
start  marching  south.  The  international 
community did force the military junta to step 
aside, but the coup leader , Captain Amadou 
Sanogo, remained the strong man in Mali and 
continues to pull many of the the strings. As 
long  as  there  is  no  legitimate  government  in 
Bamako, supported by law-abiding and credible 
armed forces, outside military intervention will 
have at best a limited and temporary impact.  
 
(3) A government is not legitimate unless it 
is  perceived  as  such  by  all  parts  of  the 
population.  In  Mali,  this  means  perspectives 
should be offered to the Tuareg in the north of 
the country. Their marginalization has been a 
source of conflict in the region for decades and 
is at the heart of the conflict today. Extending 
a serious political and economic offer to the 
Tuareg  is  all  the  more  urgent  as  one  of  the 
Tuareg groupings, the MNLA, has announced 
its  willingness  to  support  the  military 
intervention by  engaging the jihadist militias. 
Taking  into  account  the  wide  cultural  and 
political gap between the south and the north 
of  the  country,  it  is  far  from  certain  though 
that  Bamako  (or  the  neighbouring  countries, 
where there are important Tuareg populations 
too)  will  accept  to  address  Tuareg  demands 
and  even  less  to  reaffirm  Tuareg  self-
government,  agreed  upon  in  1991  .  If  they 
would indeed be unwilling to do so, than the 
current conflict will only be the precursor of 
the next armed struggle.  
 
COMPREHENSIVE  RESPONSIBILITY  OF 
THE EU  
The  comprehensive  approach  that  is  thus 
called for is exactly what the EU Strategy for 
the Sahel envisages. It is encouraging to note 
that a strong sense that peace and stability in 
the  Sahel  (and  in  the  Horn  of  Africa)  are 
directly  in  the  interest  of  the  EU,  and  are 
therefore  a  European  responsibility,  is 
increasingly  developing  in  Brussels  and  the 
capitals  of  the  Member  States  alike.  Which 
makes  it  all  the  more  surprising  that  the 
current  crisis  management  operation  is  a 
unilateral French, and not an EU initiative.  
 
The  EU  had  been  preparing  a  training 
mission (or EUTM). Its deployment has now 
been  accelerated  in  reaction  to  the  current 
crisis, the Foreign Affairs Council meeting in 
an extraordinary session on 17 January for that 
purpose. In line with the objective of African 
ownership and the justified reluctance to get 
directly  engaged  in  combat,  the  objective  of   3 
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EUTM  has  always  been  to  train  the  Malian 
armed  forces  rather  than  to  participate  in 
operations – it is not an executive mission. If as 
far  as  the  military  dimension  of  the 
comprehensive  approach  is  concerned  a 
challenge can be met by deploying an EUTM 
only, which is of course the ideal scenario. This 
scenario  seems  to  be  becoming  reality  in 
Somalia – finally, for one should not forget that 
Somalia has been in a state of anarchy and civil 
war for two decades now.  
 
One  should  not  nurture  the  illusion  that 
each  and  every  problem  can  be  solved  by 
offering training though. The rightful desire to 
keep as light a footprint as possible carries the 
risk that chances to control a problem before it 
escalates are missed. The logistic circumstances 
are  very  difficult,  but  in  the  Sahel,  in  the 
absence  of  heavy  capabilities  (especially  air 
support)  among  the  local  parties,  deploying 
even limited assets (notably fighter aircraft and 
helicopters) can make a big difference. That is 
exactly what France is now doing in the current 
crisis situation, its hand forced by the jihadist 
militias,  in  the  full  knowledge  from  the 
negotiations  about  EUTM  that  there  was  no 
appetite for a combat operation under the flag 
of the EU itself. The French intervention was 
immediately welcomed by London and Berlin 
among  other  EU  capitals.  The  High 
Representative,  Catherine  Ashton,  kept 
strangely quiet, not mentioning the operation in 
any of her statements on Mali until finally in a 
debate  in  the  European  Parliament  on  15 
January  she  paid  “tribute  to  those  member 
states,  particularly  France,  as  well  as  the 
countries  of  West  Africa,  who  have  come  to 
Mali’s aid”.  
 
Two conclusions can already be drawn from 
this state of affairs.  
 
(1)  For  now,  in  Mali,  EU  involvement 
remains vital. EUTM was conceived from the 
outset  as  one  part  of  a  comprehensive 
approach, linked notably to establishing 
a legitimate government in Bamako and 
inter-Malian  reconciliation,  code  word 
for  a  comprehensive  (and  probably 
regional)  political  dialogue  with  the 
Tuareg. Only the EU can take charge of 
the  various  political,  economic  and 
humanitarian dimensions. By also fully 
supporting  the  French  military 
intervention  politically,  the  EU  will 
strengthen its impact – and should make sure 
that  it  subscribes  to  the  same  political 
objectives as EUTM.  
 
(2) For the future, EU Member States must 
realize  that  adopting  strategies  goes  hand  in 
hand  with  assuming  responsibility.  The  Sahel 
strategy is a good example of a comprehensive 
approach,  without  which  no  military 
intervention  can  achieve  anything.  But  the 
opposite  holds  true  as  well:  had  the  jihadist 
militias been allowed to march on Bamako, the 
whole  strategy  would  have  become 
meaningless. All those who subscribed to the 
Sahel Strategy ought thus to feel responsible for 
acting in the current crisis situation. But even if 
more Member States would go beyond a paper 
commitment  to  the  Sahel  strategy,  today  the 
EU  institutions  are  simply  not  equipped  to 
launch a rapid response operation of this type – 
there is no better illustration of the need for 
more  permanent  planning  and  conduct 
structures as well as intelligence assets within 
the EEAS. Then a High Representative could 
“For  the  EU  and  all  of  its 
Members States, it is time to live 
up to the strategies to which they 
so kindly signed up.”   4 
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initiate  crisis  response,  rather  than  having  to 
react to it (or waiting to do so).  
 
CONCLUSION  
A final modest suggestion by way of conclusion, 
to  decision-makers,  academia  and  the  media 
alike.  Let  us  this  time  forget  the  hyperboles 
about  “international  terrorism”  and  a  mythical 
al-Qaeda,  which  no  longer  exists.  They  only 
strengthen  local  extremists  in  their  conviction 
that  they  are  part  of  a  mighty  international 
movement  against  the  West  –  and  that  the 
Malian militias definitely are not. Mali is part of 
Europe’s  “broader  neighbourhood”,  where 
peace and stability, or the absence thereof, has 
an impact on our vital interests, but the militias 
are no vital threat to western civilization. They 
are  a  very  real  threat  to  the  average  Malian 
citizen  though,  and  that  should  be  sufficient 
reason for us to care. For the EU and all of its 
Members States, time to live up to the strategies 
to which they so kindly signed up. 
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